Sexual Consent and Epistemic Partiality in Rape Fact-Finding

Talita Ferrantelli

doi:10.22197/rbdpp.v9i3.776

Autores

Talita Ferrantelli London School of Economics, London https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1147-0633

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v9i3.776

Palavras-chave:

leis de estupro; consentimento sexual; procedimentos probatórios; justificação; parcialidade epistêmica.

Resumo

A teoria do direito feminista discute leis de estupro e noções de consentimento sexual buscando refletir de maneira mais precisa as experiências de sobreviventes de crimes sexuais, bem como abordar distorções de poder nos arcabouços legais que perpetuam a subordinação das mulheres. Neste artigo, exploro uma forma alternativa de crítica às leis de estupro baseadas no consentimento e aos vieses presentes nos sistemas legais. Argumento que as justificativas usadas para selecionar e avaliar as evidências em casos de estupro são epistemicamente questionáveis devido à falta de confiabilidade de suas fontes epistêmicas. Meu argumento, construído com base na análise social realista radical na teoria política, visa revelar um defeito epistêmico nos procedimentos de evidência em casos de estupro, que denomino parcialidade epistêmica. Sugiro que esse defeito epistêmico apresenta razões relevantes para desafiar as leis de estupro baseadas em ideais de consentimento. Espero demonstrar que uma abordagem realista radical pode trazer razões para questionar as leis de estupro e falhas nos sistemas de evidência sem a necessidade de concordar ou depender de compromissos e objetivos políticos feministas. Esse tipo de crítica pode efetivamente contornar certas dificuldades da teoria feminista, e potencialmente contribuir para discussões centradas em distorções de poder dentro dos sistemas legais.

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Biografia do Autor

Talita Ferrantelli, London School of Economics, London

Talita is a Ph.D. candidate in the Philosophy Department of the London School of Economics and a Junior Lecturer at the PPLE College at the University of Amsterdam. Previously, she completed a Master of Science in Political Theory and a Master of Arts in Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. She holds a Bachelor's Degree in Law from Escola de Direito da Fundação Getúlio Vargas de São Paulo.

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