Injustiças Testemunhais Institucionalizadas: A construção do Mito da Confissão

Miranda Fricker

doi:10.22197/rbdpp.v9i1.820

Autores

Miranda Fricker New York University, New York

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v9i1.820

Palavras-chave:

Injustiça testemunhal, injustiça agencial, injustiça testemunhal institucionalizada, excesso de credibilidade

Resumo

Embora as injustiças testemunhais tenham sido pensadas originalmente por Miranda Fricker apenas como redução de credibilidade, neste texto a autora assume a redefinição proposta por Jennifer Lackey para incluir, dentro das injustiças testemunhais, também a hipótese de excesso de credibilidade causada por uma injustiça agencial, isto é, quando a injustiça é cometida por se atribuir excesso de credibilidade a declarações precisamente quando a agência epistêmica do sujeito (as condições de agir como um sujeito de conhecimento) foi obstruída. A partir de sua preocupação com as instituições, Fricker tanto examina o contexto da justiça criminal que propicia as falsas confissões como propõe reflexões sobre as mudanças que são necessárias para a implementação de mais justiça epistêmica no interior dos sistemas de justiça criminal.

Downloads

Os dados de download ainda não estão disponíveis.

Biografia do Autor

Miranda Fricker, New York University, New York

Professora do departamento de Filosofia da NYU e co-diretora do New York Institute for Philosophy. Doutora.

Referências

Allen, Danielle (2017) Cuz: Or the life and times of Michael A. (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation)

Alexander, Michelle (2010) The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The New Press)

Anderson, Elizabeth (2020) ‘Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/feminism-epistemology/

Anderson, Elizabeth (2012) ‘Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions’ Social Epistemology 20(2): 163-73

Battaly, Heather, Kidd, Ian J., and Cassam, Quassim (2021) Vice Epistemology (London: Routledge)

Battaly, Heather (2014) ‘Varieties of Epistemic Vice’ in J. Matheson & R. Vitz (eds.) The Ethics of Belief (OUP)

Boudewijn de Bruin and Barend de Rooij (2022) ‘Real Life Collective Epistemic Virtue and Vice’ in Mark Alfano, Colin Klein, and Jeroen De Ridder (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology (London & New York: Routledge): 396-423

Carel, Havi & Kidd, Ian James (2021) ‘Institutional Opacity, Epistemic Vulnerability, and Institutional Testimonial Justice’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29(4): 473-96

Cassam, Quassim (2016) ‘Vice Epistemology’ The Monist 99: 159-180

Cassam, Quassim (2019) Vices of the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Coates, Ta-Nehisi (2017) ‘The black family in the age of mass incarceration’ in We Were Eight Years In Power: An American Tragedy (New York: One World)

Collins, Patricia Hill (2000) Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment 2nd ed. (New York & London: Routledge)

Craig, Edward Knowledge and the State of Nature. An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)

Crerar, Charlie (2017) ‘Motivational Approaches to Intellectual Vice’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(4): 753-766

Davis, Angela (2003) Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: Seven Stories Press)

Davis, Emmalon (2016) ‘Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice’ Hypatia Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 2016)

Dotson, Kristie (2012) ‘A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression’ Frontiers 33(1): 24–47

Dotson, Kristie (2014) ‘Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression’ Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy 28(2): 115-138

Drizin, S. A. & Leo, R. A. (2004) ‘The problem of false confessions in the post-DNA world’, North Carolina Law Review 82: 891-1007

Fricker, Miranda (1998) ‘Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards A Truly Social Epistemology’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. XVIII Pt. 2: 159-77

Fricker, Miranda (1999) ‘Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp. Vol. 25: 191-210

Fricker, Miranda (2007) Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Fricker, Miranda (2010) ‘Can There Be Institutional Virtues?’ Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol. 3 eds. T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne: 235-252

Fricker, Miranda (2016) ‘Epistemic Injustice and the Preservation of Ignorance’ The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance eds. M. Blaauw & R. Peels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Fricker, Miranda (2021) ‘Institutional Epistemic Vices: The Case of Inferential Inertia’ in eds. Heather Battaly and Ian J. Kidd Epistemic Vice (Routledge) pp. 89-107

Gilmore, Ruth Wilson (2022) Abolition Geography: Essays Towards Liberation (New York: Verso)

Grasswick, Heidi (2019) ‘Feminist Social Epistemology’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/feminist-social-epistemology/

Gudjonsson, Gisli H. (2018) The Psychology of Confessions: Forty Years of Science and Practice (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons)

Gudjonsson, G. H. & Pearse, J. (2011) ‘Suspect interviews and false confessions’ Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20: 33-37

Harding, Sandra (1991) Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (Milton Keynes: Open University Press)

Inbau, F. E., Reid, J. E., Buckley, J. P., & Jayne, B. C. (2013) Criminal interrogation and confessions (5th ed.) (Burlington: Jones and Bartlett Learning)

Jordan, Sarah & Hartwig, Maria (2013) ‘On the phenomenology of innocence: The role of Belief in a Just World’ Psychiatry, Psychology and the Law 20(5): 749-760

Kassin, S. M. (2022) Duped: Why Innocent People Confess—and Why We Believe Their Confessions (Amherst/New York: Prometheus Books)

Kassin, S. M., & Gudjonsson, G. H. (2004) ‘The psychology of confessions. A review of the literature and issues’ Psychological Science in the Public Interest 5: 33-67

Kassin, S. M. (2005) ‘On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?’ American Psychologist: 215-228

Kassin, S. M., Drizin, Steven A., Grisso, Thomas, Gudjonsson, Gisli H., Leo, Richard A., Redlich, Allison D., (2010) ‘Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations’ Law Hum Behav 34: 3-38

Kassin, S. M. (2012) ‘Why Confessions Trump Innocence’ American Psychologist Vol. 67, No. 6: 431-45

Kassin, S. M. and Wrightsman, L. S. (1985) ‘Confession evidence’ in S. M. Kassin & L. S. Wrightsman (eds.) The psychology of evidence and trial procedures: 67-94 (London: Sage)

Lackey, Jennifer (2020) ‘False Confessions and Testimonial Injustice’ Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 110 (1): 43-68

Lackey, Jennifer (forthcoming) Criminal Testimonial Injustice

Mason, Rebecca (2011) ‘Two Kinds of Unknowing’ Hypatia 26 (2): 294-307

Medina, José (2011) ‘The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary’, Social Epistemology Special Issue 25/1: 15-35

Medina, José (2013) Epistemologies of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

José Medina (2021) ‘Capital vices, institutional failures, and epistemic neglect in a county jail’ in I. J. Kidd, H. Battaly & Q. Cassam eds. Vice Epistemology (Abingdon: Routledge)

Mills, Charles (2007) ‘White Ignorance’. In Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, ed. Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana. NY: SUNY Press

Mills, Charles (2015) ‘Global White Ignorance’. In Matthias Gross and Linsey McGoey (eds.) Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance Studies. London/NY: Routledge

Pearse, J. & Gudjonsson, G. H. (1999) ‘Measuring influential police interviewing tactics: A factor analytic approach’ Legal and Criminological Psychology 4: 221-238

Andrea J. Pitts (2019) ‘Carceral Medicine and Prison Abolition: Trust and Truth-Telling in Correctional healthcare’ ch. 13 in Benjamin R. Sherman and Stacey Goguen (eds.) Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives

Pohlhaus, Gaile (2012) ‘Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance’ Hypatia 27 (3): 715-735

Shawyer A., Milne B., & Bull, R. (2009) ‘Investigative interviewing in the UK’, in T. Williamson, B. Milne, & S. P. Savage eds. International developments in investigative interviewing (Cullompton, Devon: Wilan Publishing) pp. 24-37

Snook, B., Luther, K., & Barron, T. (2016) ‘Interviewing suspects in Canada’ in D. Walsh, G. E. Oxburgh, A. D. Redlich, & T. Mykelburts (eds.) International developments and practices in investigative interviewing and interrogation Volume 2: Suspects (pp. 229-239) (London: Routledge)

Tanesini, Alessandra (2018) ‘Epistemic Vice and Motivation’ Metaphilosophy 49(3): 350-67

Tanesini, Alessandra (2021) The Mismeasure of the Self: A study in vice epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Tremain, Shelley (forthcoming) ‘Philosophy of Disability, Conceptual Engineering, and the Nursing-Home Industrial Complex in Canada’ International Journal of Critical Diversity Studies

Queloz, Matthieu (2021) The Practical Origins of Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Williams, Bernard (2002) Truth and Truthfulness. An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton: Princeton University Press)

Yap, Audrey (2017) ‘Credibility Excess and the Social Imaginary in Cases of Sexual Assault’, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3(4): 1-24