Jueces e injusticias epistémicas
Recomendaciones institucionales y la interdependencia de lo individual y lo estructural
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v9i1.794Palabras clave:
injustica epistémica, juez, prejuicios, recomendaciones institucionales, enfoques individualista y estructuralistaResumen
Las injusticias epistémicas causan un mal a alguien en su condición de sujeto epistémico; es decir, como sujeto que participa en la producción, mantención y transmisión de bienes epistémicos. Asumiendo que una de las metas, pero no ciertamente la única, del sistema judicial es promover decisiones que sean razonablemente plausibles, las injusticias epistémicas interfieren con dicha meta. Un objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer un par de recomendaciones institucionales que contribuyen a disminuir las injusticias epistémicas que los jueces pudieran cometer. Estas recomendaciones se basan en data empírica proveniente de las ciencias sociales. Otro objetivo es argumentar, en parte en base a esas intervenciones, que ni el enfoque individualista ni el estructuralista, que ubican el problema y los cambios necesarios para remediarlo en la mente del individuo o las estructuras de nuestro entorno (respectivamente), son adecuadamente concebidos. En particular, el artículo responde a la pregunta: ¿qué tipo de intervenciones, dada la data empírica disponible, es más probable que sea eficiente?, mostrando que esas intervenciones son híbridas, combinando lo individual y lo estructural, dada la interdependencia de lo individual y lo estructural, y ofreciendo dos ejemplos ilustrativos de distintas estrategias de este tipo de intervenciones.
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Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
A partir de 2022, los artículos publicados en el RDPP tienen una licencia Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional. Los artículos publicados hasta 2021 adoptaron la licencia Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial 4.0 Internacional.
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