A vueltas con la duda razonable y la lógica difusa:: ¿necesitamos una regla heurística?

Juan Sebastián Vera

doi:10.22197/rbdpp.v8i3.750

Authors

Juan Sebastián Vera Universidad de Chile, Santiago https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9578-8213

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v8i3.750

Keywords:

fuzzy logic, standard of reasonable doubt, inductive probability, evaluating evidence

Abstract

This paper considers making use of fuzzy logic in order to apply the standard of proof "beyond any reasonable doubt". This standard is used in many criminal justice systems on civil and common law. I will suggest the construction of an heuristic rule from the evaluation of epistemic’s generalizations and the relationship between them, related to the essential facts of the case. It will employ the union and conjunction propriety of fuzzy logic.

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Author Biography

Juan Sebastián Vera, Universidad de Chile, Santiago

Doctor en Derecho Universidad de Barcelona. Profesor Asistente de Derecho procesal, Universidad de Chile. Correo electrónico: jsvera@derecho.uchile.cl.

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